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Abstract 
The relative merits of direct vs. indirect taxes have been largely debated since the advent of 
public finance theory. The current phase of the discussion concerns the relative ability of these 
two kinds of taxes to creating a more growth-friendly environment. The prevailing view favours 
indirect taxation, and suggests a shift of the fiscal burden towards indirect taxes, especially those 
on consumption. We shall be looking only briefly at this last question, as this paper has two other 
principal aims. The first aim is to evaluate the entity of the said tax shift over the last decade 
across Euro Area (EA-17) member countries. Our conclusion is that a “true” tax shift  has not 
been as widespread and large as the EU Commission believes. Secondly, among the most widely-
debated issues concerning the tax shift, we are going to examine the contrasting short-term 
impacts on the economy resulting from it, and we shall outline the possible risk that, in the short 
term, this tax shift may exacerbate the economic slump spreading across the European Union, 
particularly as an effect of the general adoption of restrictive fiscal policies by almost all member 
countries.  
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1. Introduction* 
 
 Broadly speaking, the relative merits of direct vs. indirect taxes have been debated since the 
beginning of public finance theory (for all: Musgrave, 1969 and Steve, 1976 for historical views: 
Albi and Martinez Vasquez, 2011, for an updated view, and Tanzi, 2011, for a discussion of tax 
trends in recent years in the OECD countries). To give just one, clear example, around the middle of 
the last century, Comprehensive Personal Income Tax (PIT) proved widely successful. However, 
during the same period, indirect taxes flourished again, as a consequence of the proliferation of 
VAT. In turn, social security contributions were raised to finance the growth of the welfare state. 
More or less at the same time, the emergence of the theory of optimal taxation indicated the 
theoretical conditions under which direct or indirect taxes, or a mix of both, are preferable (see 
Salaniè, 2011, and Boadway, 2012, for an updated view).  
The main issue of the present debate concerns the relative capacity of these two kinds of taxes to 
create a more growth-friendly environment. The prevailing view is in favour of indirect taxation, 
and this view has been endorsed by some of the most influential international economic 
organizations, such as the EU and the OECD. For some years now, they have been suggesting 
(Johansson et al., 2008; OECD, 2010b; EU Commission, 2011, for all) that member countries 
restructure their tax systems by shifting the fiscal burden from direct to indirect taxation, and in 
particular from labour to consumption taxes. Moreover, according to the EU Commission’s view, 
the tax shift has already gained ground among the member countries and continues to do so (EU 
Commission, 2012a). Two sentences summarize this viewpoint: “Almost all the results support the 
claim that a move from income taxation to consumption taxation will raise the rate of growth” 
(Myles, 2009) and “There has been a general tendency over the last years to shift taxation from 
labour and capital toward the taxation of consumption” (EU Commission, 2011). 
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we shall try to evaluate the extent of the tax shift over the 
past decade, and whether it has affected all EA-17 member countries. Our conclusion is that “true” 
(see below) tax shifts have not proliferated, and are not proliferating to the extent that the EU 
Commission believes. Secondly, we shall examine the contrasting short-term impacts of the tax 
shift on the economy, which has been disregarded to a certain extent in the literature. We shall 
outline the fact that, in the short term, the tax shift may exacerbate the depression proliferating  
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 throughout the European Union, particularly as a result of the general adoption of restrictive fiscal  
policies by almost all member countries. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next 
section discusses the aggregated trends and forecasts (2000-2014) for the main categories of 
taxation, in order to ascertain whether the extent of the tax shift has actually affected EA-17 tax 
trends during the period under consideration. A more detailed analysis of the occurrence of the tax 
shift in individual EA-17 member countries is subsequently presented. A short discussion follows 
concerning certain reasons for the tax shift, and its possible weaknesses. Finally, we shall be 
focusing on the aforementioned short-term macroeconomic effects of the tax shift. The final section 
concludes. 
 
 
2. An evaluation of the tax shift, 2000-2014 
 
 
2.1. Some features of the tax shift and the aggregated tax trends 
 
 As we are all aware, the suggestions for tax reforms that have been proposed  in recent years 
by both the EU and the OECD (EU Commission, 2011; OECD, 2010b, for all) may be summarised 
by two concepts. The first goes back to the eighties’ buzz-word of broadening tax bases and 
reducing tax rates. The second concerns the proposed shift of the total tax burden from direct to 
indirect taxes, and in particular from labour to consumption taxation. We shall examine these 
suggestions briefly later in the paper. For now, we are going to evaluate the statements offered by 
both EU and OECD, concerning the diffusion of the tax shift throughout the EA-17 and in its 
individual member States.  
The OECD (2010b), by considering the reforms which have been adopted by member 
countries in recent years, argues that they have been broadly in line with the present 
recommendations for tax reform. The main gaps consist in the failure to reduce PIT’s central rates, 
and in the failure to raise property and environmental taxes. More specifically, the EU (2011) has 
examined the last decade and observed that up until the crisis, there were very few cases of tax 
shifts, most of which were unintentional. However, since the current economic crisis, there has been 
a generalised proliferation of the tax shift and an increase reliance on indirect taxes, mainly as a 
result of increased VAT (and excise duty) rates (EU Commission, 2012a). 
 However, according to the EU Commission once again, these increases in indirect taxes 
have not necessarily given rise to a “real” tax shift, when not accompanied by a reduction in direct 
taxes and/or social security contributions. Therefore, it is important to make a distinction here 
between “Partial Tax Shift - PTS” and “Total Tax Shift - TTS”. The former takes place when an 
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increase (reduction) in total taxes is achieved by means of an increase (reduction) in indirect taxes 
(direct taxes and/or social security contributions). The latter, on the other hand, results from a 
change in the composition of the revenue side of the budget, consisting of increases in indirect taxes 
together with reductions in direct taxes and/or social security contributions. By using these two 
indicators, we can evaluate the tax trends that have characterized the EA-17 from 2000 to 20141, 
first in terms of aggregated values for the whole EA-17, and then by examining the situations of 
individual member countries.  
 To begin with, therefore, we are going to look at the trends at aggregated level for the main 
tax categories in the EA-17 for the years 2000-2014.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Looking at the entire period in question (see Table 1 and Table 4), a TTS away from direct taxes 
and/or from social security contributions towards indirect taxes does not appear at all, either in 
terms of percentages of GDP (Table 1, panel a) or as shares of total taxes (Table 1, panel b)2. Note 
in particular that the 2014 figures are rather similar to the initial ones. In order to analyse events in 
greater detail, we can break down the whole period considered here into three separate stages3: 
from 2000 to 2007, that is, the years prior to the crisis; from 2007 to 2010, that is, the years of the 
crisis; finally, from 2010 to 2014, the years of due fiscal consolidation.  
                                                
During the first stage, the changes in the main taxes appear rather limited. During the second 
stage, there was a reduction in total taxes and direct taxes, a more limited decrease  in indirect 
taxes4 and, finally, a slight increase in social security contributions. Therefore, there was only a 
genuine PTS in the case of direct taxes, considering that total taxes fell. The third stage was 
characterised by the aforesaid recovery, almost to the initial values for direct and indirect taxes, 
while social security contributions were slightly up from the values witnessed during the crisis 
years. Due to the rise in total taxes, one can talk about a “real” PTS in the case of indirect taxes 
only. Nevertheless, the trends of the main taxes were not radically affected by the crisis. 
 
 
 
1 The values for 2013 and 2014 are those forecast by the EU in November 2012 (EU Commission, Ameco data bank, 
2012b). 
2 The two indicators are displayed together because of the possible bias of each of them: a composition bias for the tax 
shares, and the effects of GDP changes for the percentages of the taxes. Note, however, that the changes in the two 
indicators generally go in the same direction. Therefore, in the reminder of the paper we shall refer to GDP percentages 
only. 
3 This seems the least arbitrary subdivision of the entire period in question. 
4 The relatively larger fall in direct taxes is due to their greater absolute value of elasticity to GDP (see Bernardi, 2011, 
for all). 
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2.2. A more detailed view, by individual member countries, 2000-2014 
 
 Now we are going to consider each EA-17 country separately, across the entire period under 
consideration and with respect to the different stages into which we have subdivided that period. 
The overall picture is somewhat different than the one for the aggregated tax trends. The main 
findings (especially with reference to the said reforms’ aims) for the whole period 2000-2014 are as 
follows (Table 2). Total taxes decreased in ten countries5 and increased in the remaining ones. 
Direct taxes decreased in ten countries6 and went up in the other ones. There were few cases of 
increases in indirect taxes (only in Finland, Cyprus, France, Estonia and Malta). Finally, and 
surprisingly, there 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
were increases in social security contributions in a slight majority of cases7. Therefore, a TTS only 
emerged in the countries where the increase in indirect taxes was coupled with a reduction in direct 
taxes (or social security contributions, in the case of Malta). On the contrary, PTSs, deriving from a 
reduction in direct taxes, were witnessed in several countries8. PTSs driving from a reduction in 
social security contributions were only seen in the Slovak Republic, Germany, Greece and Spain. 
Looking now at the three stages into which we have divided the whole period, a slight 
reduction in taxes was widespread from 2000 to 2007 (Table 3).  Reductions in total taxes prevailed 
(nine countries)9, and this trend was more or less mirrored by reductions in direct taxes10. Indirect 
taxes only increased in five countries (the Netherlands, Cyprus, Estonia, Portugal and Malta), while 
social security contributions fell in nine countries11. At a first glance, many changes seem to have 
been in the direction pursued by the EU/OECD. However, “real” TTSs were only seen in the 
Netherlands, Malta and Estonia, where a reduction in direct taxes, and/or social security 
contributions, was coupled with an increase in indirect taxes. “Real” PTSs in the case of direct taxes 
may be found in five countries (Slovak Republic, Luxembourg, Estonia, Germany and France), and 
there were four cases of decreases in social security contributions (the Slovak Republic, 
Luxemburg, Germany and France).  
 
                                                 
5 The Netherlands, Finland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium, Greece and 
Estonia. 
6 The Netherlands, Finland, the Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Belgium, Estonia and Spain. 
7 The Netherlands, Finland, Cyprus, France, Belgium, Estonia, Portugal, Austria and Italy. 
8 Finland, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium and Spain. 
9 The Netherlands, Finland, the Slovak Republic, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Austria, Cyprus and Greece. 
10 Slovak Republic, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Belgium, and Estonia. 
11 The Netherlands, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium, Estonia, Austria, and Malta. 
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TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 The period 2007-2010 was in the main characterised by the effects of the economic crisis. 
Direct taxes fell in all countries except for the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Indirect taxes also fell 
(albeit to a lesser extent) in the majority of countries, with the exception of Estonia, Finland, 
Germany and Austria. Therefore, there was a TTS in the latter countries (given the fall in direct 
taxes), while a PTS occurred in the aforementioned cases of reductions in direct taxation12, and to a 
greater extent in Greece, owing to the reduction in social security contributions. 
 If we look, finally, at the period 2010-2014, for which the Commission had forecast a 
proliferation of total and partial tax shifts, we see a widespread recovery of taxes and a number of 
tax shifts, albeit generally of a limited entity (see below). An increase in total taxes is estimated and 
forecasted for all countries (with the exception of Spain and Estonia); however the percentage 
change in the average value of GDP is close to 1%. Direct taxes only fell in four cases (the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Estonia and Italy). Indirect taxes’ share on GDP increased in all but six 
countries13, albeit only by an average EU-17 value of 0.4%. On the contrary, social security 
contributions fell slightly in the majority of countries14 (EA-17 average: -0. 3%). Again, despite the 
large number of shifts in the different taxes (and in the sought-after direction), a “real” TTS can 
only be envisaged in eight countries15, as a consequence of the increase in indirect taxes, coupled 
with a reduction in social security contributions (or direct taxes, in the cases of Luxemburg and 
Italy). There were fewer PTSs than TTSs. In fact, they were only reported in Estonia (direct taxes 
and social security contributions), France and Malta (indirect taxes), and Spain (social security 
contributions). 
 
 
2.3 TTS and PTS: a synthesis 
 
A synthesis of TTSs and PTSs may now prove interesting. As we have seen, the taxes’ 
aggregated trends reveal a limited number of PTSs, and no TTSs, during the entire period under 
consideration. A PTS emerged during the 2007-2010 period due to the reduction in direct taxes, but 
this was a consequence of the economic downturn brought on by the crisis. Moreover, PTSs are also 
present in the 2010-2014 period, as a consequence of increases in both indirect and total taxes. To 
sum up then, we see once again that the changes in taxation implemented during the period in 
question did not modify the long-term aggregated trends of total and principal taxes.  
                                                 
12 The Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Ireland, France, Estonia, Portugal, Malta, Spain and Italy. 
13 The Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Ireland, Estonia and Spain. 
14 Finland, Slovenia, Ireland, Germany, Estonia, Portugal, Austria, Greece, Italy and Spain. 
15 Luxembourg, Finland, Slovenia, Germany, Portugal, Austria, Greece and Italy. 
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Moving on now to an analysis by individual country (Table 4) covering the entire time span 
2000-2014, there were 39 cases of TSs: in particular 15 TTSs and 24 PTSs16. This cannot be 
considered a very large  
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
large number, bearing in mind the magnitude of the sample (17 countries for 14 years). Such cases 
are rather evenly distributed over the three stages of the entire period in question, although there is a 
certain prevalence of cases during the last sub-period. If we now break these findings down into the 
main categories of taxation, we see that there was a TTS from direct to indirect taxes in six cases, 
and from social security contributions to indirect taxes in nine cases (mostly after 2010), albeit of a 
limited entity on each occasion. This finding would seem to indicate that the process of tax-
substitution, away from direct taxes/social security contributions and towards indirect taxes, is 
driven more by the reduction in social security contributions than by a reduction in direct taxes. 
Considering PTSs now, direct taxes prevail (in ten cases), albeit largely because of the said cyclical 
downturn associated with the global crisis. The number of PTSs is far lower in cases of indirect 
taxes (four) and social security contributions (six).  
To sum up, we would conclude that there have been very few “real” TTSs. Moreover, we 
may presume that some of them have been unintentional and/or induced by the dynamics of the 
economic cycle. There have also been few PTSs given the magnitude of the entire sample of 
national cases. Finally, one may see again (Table 3) that both TTSs and PTSs have tended to be of a 
limited entity17. Therefore, the data seem to confirm the EU Commission’s previous view that prior 
to the crisis, any TTSs towards indirect taxes were only episodic and often unintentional. It is also 
true, again according to the Commission, that cases of increased indirect taxes and reduced social 
security contributions have risen since the crisis years, although they have generally been of a 
limited entity, as we have already seen18, and in several cases they failed to give rise to any “real” 
PTS or TTS.  
                                                 
16 These figures do not include the cases of TSs found in the estimates concerning all years within the sample, because 
of possible overlapping with the subsample estimates. 
17 Note that the changes reported in Tables 2 and 3 refer to percentage variations in tax-to-GDP percentages, and not to 
linear differences among the latter. 
18 The stability of revenue from indirect taxes is somewhat puzzling, if one considers that in the EA-17, VAT and excise 
duty rates rose in all but five countries (Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Austria and the Slovak Republic) during the 
investigated period. From 2008 to 2012, the European standard average VAT rate rose from 19.4% to 21.0%, a change 
that was mirrored by the implicit tax rate on consumption (EU Commission, 2012a). 
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2.4. A short discussion on the tax shift 
 
Perhaps TSs were more widespread, but the case for raising consumption taxes’ share of total 
taxes is not as straightforward as the EU and OECD, among others, believed it to be. There are a 
number of debatable issues here which may be summarized, in the extreme, as follows (see Bocconi 
University, 2011, for an excellent discussion of this topic, which we shall be making  a number of 
references to)19.  
 The suggestions made by the EU and the OECD (see once again OECD, 2010b and EU 
Commission 2011, for all) in favour of a shift in the fiscal burden away from wage income towards 
consumption20, are not primarily grounded on the traditional argument concerning the different 
bases of income and consumption taxation, particularly since the latter does not include capital 
income, and therefore does not affect savings decisions, and should thus be more favourable to 
economic growth. Nor are they entirely based on the prescriptions of optimal taxation theory. The 
arguments in favour of the tax shift are rooted, on the contrary, in the ranking of various 
distortions21 and of other hampering effects linked to different kinds of taxes, especially on the 
supply side and in the long term. These negative effects differently characterize the various kinds of 
taxation. In particular, there are two main arguments in favour of the suggestion that wage taxes  
should be replaced by consumption taxes. The first argument states that income tax is more 
distortive than consumption tax, because it discourages labour supply and demand, being part of the 
tax wedge. Reducing this wedge may boost labour supply and demand. Furthermore, lower labour 
costs may enhance economic growth, by stimulating investment. However, caution is required here 
in two different grounds. First the total elasticity of labour supply and demand is generally 
estimated to be low in European countries, so that the effect of a reduction  in the tax wedge on 
employment may be limited22, unless the shift is very large, which would then imply a broad 
restructuring of public services as a result (Bernardi, 2004). The second reservation  is that  any 
                                                 
19 See the same source also for a review of the (limited) European studies of the effects of TSs. 
20 This, however, at the global crisis has now exacerbated (EU Commission, 2011, for all). 
21 The degree of distortion and of other hampering effects is derived from analyses of economic agents’ behavior, from 
DAGEs (with endogenous technical progress), and finally, from cross-country estimations. The latter may be found in 
Johnson, 2008 and in OECD, 2010b. 
22 A great number of studies have been made regarding this topic. However, far fewer analyses have tried to assess the 
effects of measures adopted in the real word to reduce the tax wedge. Among these analyses, the Bocconi University 
(2011) study estimates the effects of a large sample of (historically limited) measures to reduce PIT and SSC. The 
results reveal the limited impact that such measures have had on unemployment, and on the participation and intensity 
of labour, and no impact on poverty or inequality. Hence, income tax changes designed to sustain the labour supply 
and/or improve the equity of incomes, may be more effective if they are selective: i.e. low rates for low earners, second 
jobs, the young and the elderly.  
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increase in consumption taxes, whether passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices or not, 
may offset the effects concerning the reduction in the tax wedge23.  
 The other argument in favour of a tax shift, is that consumption has a larger base than wage 
income, due to the presence of certain taxpayers who finance their consumption from sources of 
income other than wages. This enlargement of the tax base would permit a reduction in tax rates and 
a subsequent improvement in social welfare24. This would be the real efficiency effect of the tax 
shift; however, it also raises certain rather unwelcome redistributive implications (Bocconi 
University, 2011). Indeed, the shift would be detrimental to non-wage-earners who do not benefit 
from income tax reductions (and would be especially painful for those drawing non-indexed social 
security benefits). An on-off taxation emerges which hits the accumulated wealth (of the old in 
particular), the market value of which consequently falls. Furthermore, the tax shift is to the 
detriment of the young and old (who have a greater propensity to consume), thus creating a 
distortion in inter-general redistribution. Moreover, consumption taxation has been further criticized 
as being regressive. However, this effect may be mitigated by means of the adoption of subsides for 
the poor, or by making income tax more progressive (see, for all, Johnson and Myles, 2011, and 
Kaplow, 2011).  
 
 
3. Short-term macroeconomic effects of the tax shift 
 
As for the short-term macroeconomic effects of the tax shift, two contrasting issues appear 
to require closer examination. Firstly, when rates of exchange are fixed in an open economy, the 
shift from labour to consumption taxes may give rise to a kind of “internal devaluation”. Lower 
labour taxes may be passed on to the costs and prices of domestic production. In turn, VAT is not 
charged on exports but only on imports and non-traded goods (Bocconi University, 2011, for all). 
This is equivalent to the devaluation of the rate of exchange, leading to an increase in 
competitiveness. However, this effect may only be short-lived, as the trade balance is redressed, 
especially if nominal wages and social benefits are price-indexed. A reduction in indexation could 
be implemented, but such would be politically unpalatable, socially unfair and may reduce the 
purchasing power of workers and the elderly. Although its effects are just temporary, the internal 
devaluation process may trigger aggregate demand, which could prove useful in times of economic 
recession. 
                                                 
23 Traditionally, consumption tax rates are not included in the tax wedge, contrary to what has been suggested by a 
growing body of literature (Cnossen, 2002, for a pioneering view, and OECD, 2010a, for empirical analyses). 
24 On its turn, an enlargement of VAT basis (e.g. to the financial sector) may instead make the tax less regressive, also 
in the case of the adoption of a single tax rate (see, for all, Johnson and Myles, 2011). 
 9
 Secondly25, we should point out that the previous arguments for and against the tax shift 
have completely disregarded the short-term effects on Keynesian demand in a non-full-employment 
market situation. Certain recent empirical findings concerning the fact that indirect taxes may or 
may not be more deflationary than direct income taxes, are of interest here. Before considering such 
findings, it is worth noting that in the present economic situation within the EU, the so-called “non-
Keynesian fiscal effects” (a survey in Gravelle. and Hungerford, 2011) do not seem to be at work 
(EU Commission, 2010; Pisauro, 2012, and Coenen et al., 2012). Furthermore, Keynesian fiscal 
policies are particularly relevant in times of recession. In this regard, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) 
report that present fiscal consolidation policies are based on largely underestimated values of the 
fiscal multipliers26. 
 More generally, at present the value of specific Keynesian tax (de)multipliers appears 
debatable, according to currently available empirical evidence (see, for all, VvAa, 2011 and 
Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). However, it might well be that the less distortionary taxes (like 
consumption taxes compared to labour taxes, in the view of the EU/OECD) have a greater 
deflationary effect on demand. Initial evidence may be found in Table 5 below, which reports a 
study by the ECB on the short-term multipliers of the various levies. These findings are of a 
somewhat mixed nature. According to the estimated values of multipliers, a shift from PIT to 
indirect taxes would be restrictive in five cases, and expansionary in four cases. As for a shift from 
social security contributions, restrictive effects would be felt in four cases while expansionary 
effects would be present in six cases. To sum up, the tax shifts we have considered here, away from 
PIT and social security contributions towards consumption taxes, would be either restrictive or 
expansionary in roughly the same number of cases. In the EA-17 as a whole, the indirect tax-
multiplier  - in absolute values - is lower than that of both PIT and social security contributions at 
time t, but is higher than both of them at time t+1. 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Hence, on the basis of this study, one may conclude that a tax shift from PIT and/or social 
security contributions towards indirect/consumption taxes may actually have deflationary effects on 
demand in a number of countries and situations, albeit not in all. Like the ECB, other international 
economic organizations have recently produced large-scale simulations of the effects of fiscal 
restraints achieved by means of different kinds of tax. The EU Commission (2010) has made a 
                                                 
25 What follows is largely based on Bernardi (2012). 
26 It is on the basis of similar findings (see also IMF, 2010) that the IMF now recommends lighter fiscal consolidation 
policies than those adopted in the EU. 
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number of estimates of the multipliers associated with temporary tax shocks on labour, 
consumption, property and corporate income taxes. The cases considered were with or without 
credit constraints, and with or without a Zero Interest Rate Floor (ZIRF). Surprisingly enough, the 
consumption taxes appear to be the most deflationary under all conditions, followed by labour 
taxes, property taxes and, finally, corporate income taxes. A similar ranking, for both the EU and 
the US, has been obtained through the simulation of nine econometric models (Coenen, 2012, Table 
6). More mixed results are forthcoming, however, from other recent, more specific studies27.  
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
 
To conclude an increase in indirect tax should be carefully evaluated in terms of its 
contrasting macroeconomic effects, ranging from the triggering of aggregate demand by the process 
of internal devaluation, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the curb on demand due to higher 
(de) multipliers of indirect taxes. A deflationary macroeconomic impulse might be not a good 
choice in times of widespread economic restraint, such as that affecting almost the entire EA-17 
area, especially as result of such countries’ widespread resort to deflationary fiscal policies.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
 We began this paper by remembering the fact that for some years now, both the majority of 
studies and certain highly-influential international organizations, such as the EU and the OECD, 
suggest that individual countries implement a shift from income (labour) taxes to indirect taxes 
(VAT). Indirect taxes are considered more growth-friendly, essentially not discouraging the demand 
and supply of labour28, and permitting an enlargement of the personal tax basis, which makes it 
possible to apply lower, thus less distortionary, rates. This process will invariably affect certain 
people in a negative way, in particular low income tax-payers and those who finance their 
consumption from non-wage income. Thus some form of compensation should be adopted.  
                                                 
27 Just to give some examples of a flourishing literature, Heppke - Falk (2006-Bundesbank), using the Blanchard - 
Perotti SVAR approach, find that in the case of Germany, direct taxes bring down output significantly, while indirect 
tax revenue shocks have little effect. On the contrary, according to Fair (2011), a consolidation of the US public debt 
would be less contractionary whether it is achieved through an increase in personal taxes or by means of the 
introduction of a national sales tax. The opposite is true according to Albi and Martinez-Vazquez (2011), who have 
found that in a large set of countries (both developed and developing), a 10 per cent increase in the direct-to-indirect tax 
ratio would reduce economic growth by 0.39 per cent and income inequality by 1 per cent. This last result may seem at 
odds with the a priori hypotheses, but one has to consider the greater efficiency of indirect taxes compared with direct 
taxes in the developing countries. In the case of Italy, see Caprioli and Momigliano, 2012, who also conclude that 
consolidation by means of taxation is less costly than when performed through direct expenditure. 
28 However, an increasing number of studies include consumption tax rates in the labour tax wedge, so as to reduce, at 
least partially, the differences in the effects on the labour market of the two kinds of levy. 
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According to both the EU and the OECD, the tax shift from labour to consumption, albeit 
episodic and often unintentional during the early years of this century, has received a new impetus 
in the aftermath of the current global crisis. The first part of this paper has thus attempted to 
ascertain the entity of the tax shift before and after the crisis. We have distinguished between 
“Partial Tax Shift” - PTS (i.e. an increase in consumption taxes or a reduction in labour taxes) and 
“Total Tax Shift” - TTS (i.e. the replacement of direct taxes or social security contributions with 
indirect taxes ). With regard to the 2000-2014 period (Eurostat forecast values for 2013-2014), we 
have performed an aggregated analysis of tax trends for the whole EA-17, and a disaggregated, 
country-by-country analysis. The data seem to confirm the EU Commission’s view that “real” tax 
shifts were only episodic and mostly unintentional before the crisis. The data also confirmed, in line 
with Commission’s though, that the number of cases of increased indirect taxes and reduced social 
security contributions has risen since the beginning of the crisis. However, the entity of such 
variations has been generally limited, and in the majority of situations they have not given rise to 
any “real” (“partial” or “total”) tax shift.  
 Finally, and to conclude, the gains from a tax shift do not appear to be as straightforward as 
both the EU and the OECD thought. We briefly discussed this topic in general, before evaluating 
the possible short-term macroeconomic effects of a tax shift, partly disregarded by the literature. 
Two aspects emerged, both of which require closer analysis. The first is the “internal devaluation” 
induced by the tax shift, which eliminates taxation on exports but not that on imports. The level of 
net exports would rise in the short term, but this effect would quickly fizzle out as the trade balance 
is redressed and wages and prices adjust to the new tax setting. The other aspect to be considered, 
concerning the tax shift’s impact on demand, is given by the differences between the values of the 
(de) multipliers associated with the various forms of tax. With regard to this specific question, we 
have surveyed the existing, often conflicting, literature on this issues. The main result seems to be, 
however, that the greater indirect tax de-multipliers do in fact prevail over those of labour income 
taxes. Therefore, our final conclusion regarding this last point is that the two macroeconomic effects 
we have dealt with here need to be carefully evaluated. This in order to avoid the tax shift 
representing an unsound short-term policy in times of economic depression, like the one now 
affecting virtually all EA member countries, also as a result of the restrictive fiscal policies widely 
adopted by  such countries.  
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Appendix A - Sources of EU taxation data 
 
 The main source of EU taxation data is the yearly published Taxation trends in the 
European Union, (http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/ documents /taxation/gen_info/ 
economic analysis/tax_structures/2012/report.pdf). The latest edition of this publication at the time 
of writing (November 2012) refers to figures for the 1995-2010 period. It offers a general overview 
of European tax trends, detailed analyses of selected issues, chapters for individual countries which 
also include a short description of the tax structure and recent reforms, and finally, tables 
summarising all taxes in all countries, as percentages both of GDP and of total taxation. A second 
important source is the Ameco data bank, (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_ 
indicators/ameco/index_en.htmwhich) which reports annual data on European taxation ex post 
(2001-2012) and forecast (2013-2014), together with a set of the most important macroeconomic 
aggregates. Only Government budget figures are reported in Government financial statistics - GFS 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance)_, the figures from which 
(available up to 2011) are used for the Excessive Deficit Procedure, and are the same as those 
reported in Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/ page/portal /government_finance 
_statistics /introduction. One may find detailed information concerning the institutional features of 
member countries’ taxation systems and recent reforms in the Eurostat general data bank -Taxes in 
Europe - Tax reforms” database (TEDB/TAXREF). Since 2008, a report on specific tax issues has 
been published in Monitoring tax revenues and tax reforms in EU Member States 
http://ec.europa.eu /economy_finance/publications/european_economy /2012/ee6_en.htm. Finally, 
episodic taxation data may be found in European Economy (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ 
publications/european_economy/index _en.htm) and in the European Commission’s The Annual 
growth survey (http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/annual-growth-surveys/index_en. 
htm). The data reported in the aforementioned publications are broadly similar, albeit  with  certain 
peculiarities, an idea of which is given in Table A1. As far as possible, we have made reference to 
Taxation trends in Europe (EU Commission, 2012a) and to Ameco data bank (Ameco, 2012). 
 
TABLE A1 HERE 
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Table 1 -  Structure of taxes for the whole EA-17 as percentages of GDP (a) and of total taxation (b) - 2000-2014 
                  
   2000 2007 2010 2010 2011 2012 2014 
(a)   EU Commission, 2012a Ameco data bank 
           
Direct 
taxes  12.6 12.9 11.8 11.5 12.0 12.8 12.6 
Indirect 
taxes  13.2 13.3 12.8 12.7 12.9 13.2 13.1 
Social security 
contributions  14.3 13.9 14.3 14.4 14.4 14.6 14.6 
Total   40.0 40.0 38.9 38.6 39.3 40.7 40.3 
           
(b)           
           
Direct 
taxes  31.5 32.3 30.4 29.8 30.0 31.5 31.3 
Indirect 
taxes  33.0 33.3 33.2 32.9 34.3 32.4 32.5 
Social contributions  35.8 34.8 36.8 37.3 36.6 35.9 36.2 
Total   100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
                  
Source: EU Commission, 2012a and Ameco data bank, 2012. 2013 and 2014 are forecast values (November 2012). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Structure of revenue by countries. Percentage changes in GDP percentages. The 
EA-17 countries, 2000-2014    
             
  Direct  Indirect Social security   Total   Direct  Indirect 
Social 
security  Total 
  taxes  taxes contributions taxes   taxes  taxes contributions taxes 
2000-2014  2000-2014 
NL -10.8 -3.2 7.1 -1.5  BE -3.4 -5.9 4.3 -2.2 
FI -23.4 7.2 10.1 -5.9  EE -10.4 13.0 0.9 2.6 
SK -20.3 -23.2 -7.8 -16.4  PT 12.5 -1.5 15.0 7.1 
CY -3.6 13.1 21.2 9.0  AT 3.0 -4.6 1.4 0.0 
SI 1.4 -7.6 4.9 -1.1  EL 1.0 -12.7 -1.9 -5.2 
IE 1.5 -17.8 0.1 -6.7  IT 4.2 -1.3 15.1 5.1 
LU -4.0 -8.6 10.9 -1.8  MT 51.1 8.9 -3.1 20.1 
DE -4.6 -0.9 -7.6 -4.6  ES -13.2 -11.7 -4.2 -8.2 
FR -1.6 1.3 6.2 2.7  EA-17 -3.8 -3.0 1.4 -1.5 
                     
Source: Ameco data bank, 2012. 2014 is a forecast value (November 2012).      
 
 
 
 Table 3 - Structure of revenue in individual EA-17 countries: 2000-2007/ 2007-2010/ 2010-2014. Percentage changes in GDP 
percentages    
  
EU Commission, 2012a   Ameco data bank 2012    
  2000-2007   2007-2010     
2000-
2010 2010-2014  
 Direct  Indirect
Social 
security Total Direct Indirect 
Social 
security  Total 
Memo: 
labour tax Direct Indirect Social security Total  
 taxes taxes contributions taxes taxes taxes contributions taxes wedge taxes taxes contributions taxes  
                  
 +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- +/-  
NL 1.7 4.0 -12.3 -1.2 0.0 -3.8 4.4 0.3 -8.0 -1.0 -0.1 1.7 0.6  
FI 20.2 -4.3 0.0 -4.2 -9.6 1.5 5.0 -2.1 -6.7 0.6 0.8 -0.1 1.4  
SK -17.6 -8.8 -17.0 -4.8 -12.9 -8.8 5.1 -4.1 -6.1 0.6 -0.5 0.1 0.1  
CY 23.2 53.3 13.6 -10.2 -19.6 -16.6 20.0 -11 -4.8 0.9 -0.3 0.3 1.6  
SI 23.0 -5.1 -3.5 0.4 -8.8 -2.0 10.8 0.8 -4.1 2.1 0.8 -0.1 0.0  
IE -4.5 0.0 13.6 0.0 -16.4 -13.3 16.0 -9.9 -4.0 3.1 -0.3 -1.4 1.2  
LU -12.0 -2.9 -1.0 -3.4 9.1 -5.6 9.1 -3.9 -4.0 -0.4 0.7 0.5 0.9  
DE -6.2 0.0 -11.1 -2.6 -8.2 0.9 2.0 -1.6 -2.6 1.2 0.3 -0.2 1.2  
FR -4.0 -2.5 1.2 -0.8 -8.3 -1.9 3.7 -2.1 -1.9 2.0 0.8 0.5 3.6  
BE -2.9 -2.2 -2.2 2.4 -4.1 0.0 4.4 0.0 -1.8 1.3 0.0 0.3 1.9  
EE -3.9 9.8 -3.7 0.4 -8.1 5.2 24.8 -9.6 -1.2 -0.1 -0.2 -1.3 -1.6  
PT 4.4 9.6 6.3 1.2 -6.3 -8.1 5.9 -4.0 -0.4 2.1 0.4 -0.1 1.7  
AT 1.5 -6.6 -4.1 -1.3 -5.2 3.5 5.6 0.7 0.1 1.1 0.6 -0.2 0.6  
EL 6.0 -7.1 6.7 -2.0 -8.4 -6.1 -2.7 -4.9 0.1 2.0 0.6 -1.3 2.2  
IT 4.2 -1.3 16.4 1.2 -2.0 -4.7 4.7 -0.9 0.1 -0.4 1.2 -0.1 1.6  
MT 47.8 23.6 -7.8 5.1 -1.5 -8.6 1.7 -4.3 1.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 2.1  
ES 27.4 -0.8 1.7 3.0 -26.7 -10.9 0.8 -14 1.6 0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5  
EA-
17 -0.8 -1.5 -4.1 -2.2 -8.5 -3.0 2.9 -2.8 -3.6 0.9 0.3 -0.1 1.1  
Source: EU Commission 2012a and Ameco data bank. 2014 is a forecasted value (November 2012).     
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Table 4 - Partial and total tax shifts, 2000/2007- 2007/2010-2010/2014: in the EA-17 area, and in individual member countries  
                  
    2000-2007 2007-2010         2010-2014 
  Partial   Total Partial  Total Partial Total 
              
              
(a) Aggregated              
              
Direct taxes    X       
             
Indirect taxes        X   
              
Social security 
contributions             
                     
              
(b) By countries            
                         
Direct taxes SK, LU, DE, FR  FR, EE PT, MT,                        FI, DE, EE, AT EE   
      SK, CY, IE, ES, IT       
Indirect taxes EE, PT NL, EE, MT                       FI, DE, EE, AT FR, MT FI, SI, DE, IT 
            PT, AT, EL, LU 
Social security contributions AT, SK, 
LU, DE NL, EE, MT EL    EE, ES  
 
 
FI, SI, DE, IT  
                     PT, AT, EL, LU  
                     
Source: Our own calculations based on Eurostat, 2012a and on Ameco data bank, 2012. 2014 is a forecast value.    
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Table 5 - Fiscal multipliers: effects on GDP of tax increases by/of 1 percentage point of GDP.  Euro Area and selected countries. Year 1 (t) and year 2 
(t+1). 
                                       
   Belgium  France  Germany Italy Portugal Spain  Euro Area  
   t t+1  t t+1  t t+1  t t+1  t t+1  t t+1  t t+1  
                        
Personal Income Tax -0.15 -0.23 -0.21  -0.45 -0.91 -0.18 -0.45 -0.27 -0.67 -0.35 -1.02 -0.42 -0.63  
                        
Indirect taxes  -0.15  -0.53  -0.76 -0.53 -0.39 -0.52 -0.26 -0.41 -0.37 -0.65 -0.18 -0.76  
                        
Social security 
contributions -0.01 -0.18 -0.2  -0.85 -0.88 -0.1 -0.51 -0.18 -0.44 -0.52 -1.03 -0.2 -0.62  
                                       
    Qualitative effects on GDP of tax shifts to indirect taxes         
                                
                        
from PIT   = n.a. - n.a. - + - - = + - + + -  
from social 
contributions - n.a. - n.a. + + - - - + + + + -  
                                       
Source: ECB, 2004.                      
Notes: Averages of national, EU (QUEST) and OECD (INTERLINK) models. Our own calculations.      
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 Table 6 - First year multipliers of expenditure and taxes    
                
         
 Expenditure and taxes   US   EU  
         
 Public consumption   1.55  1.52  
         
 Public investment   1.2  0.9  
         
 Targeted transfers   1.59  1.48  
         
 General transfers   0.42  0.29  
         
 Consumption taxes   -0.61  -0.66  
         
 Corporate tax   -0.24  -0.15  
         
 Labour taxes   -0.23  -0.53  
                
 Source: G. Coenen. et al., 2012.      
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Table A1- Data on EA-17 taxation from different sources: an example. Percentages of GDP  
                    
  Direct taxes  Indirect taxes 
Social security 
contributions Total 
  2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 
          
EU Commission 
2012a          
Arithmetic 11.2 - 13.1 - 12.1 - 36.4 - 
Weighted 11.8 - 12.9 - 14.2 - 38.9 - 
          
AMECO 11.5 11.9 12.8 13.0 14.4 14.5 38.7 39.4 
          
EUROSTAT - 
GFS 11.9 12.1 12.7 12.8 15.6 15.8 40.2 40.7 
                    
Sources: see text.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
